Jose Cabrera Santana v. Atty Gen USA by unknown
2012 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-17-2012 
Jose Cabrera Santana v. Atty Gen USA 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012 
Recommended Citation 
"Jose Cabrera Santana v. Atty Gen USA" (2012). 2012 Decisions. 981. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012/981 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2012 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
Nos. 11-2838 & 11-3647 
___________ 
 
JOSE ANTONIO CABRERA SANTANA, 




ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
            Respondent 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petitions for Review of Orders of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A094-222-583) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Mirlande Tadal 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 16, 2012 
 
Before: SLOVITER, GREENAWAY, JR. and COWEN, Circuit Judges 
 







 Jose Antonio Cabrera Santana (“Santana”) petitions for review of two decisions 
issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”).  The two petitions have been 




 Santana, a native and citizen of the Dominican Republic, entered the United States 
in 1991.  In June 2000, he pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to 
distribute cocaine base.  In September 2003, the District Court sentenced him to time 
served and three years’ supervised release. 
 In June 2010, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings 
against Santana, alleging that he was removable on the following bases:  (1) as an alien 
present in the United States without having been admitted or paroled, see 8 U.S.C.  
§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i); (2) as an alien who a consular officer or the Attorney General knows 
or has reason to believe is or has been an illicit trafficker in a controlled substance or is or 
has been a knowing aider, abettor, assister, conspirator, or colluder with others in the 
illicit trafficking of a controlled substance, see 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(C); and (3) as an 
alien convicted of a controlled substance offense, see 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II).  At 
a master calendar hearing in September 2010, Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Andrew Arthur 
determined that Santana was removable on all three grounds, and that Santana’s drug 
conviction constituted an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B).  At that 
same hearing, Santana applied for relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).  
 In February 2011, IJ Mirlande Tadal (hereinafter “the IJ”), to whom Santana’s 
case had been reassigned, held a hearing on the merits of his application.  Santana 
testified that, following his arrest in 2000, he cooperated with federal authorities by 
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providing information about the narcotics activities in which he had been involved.  
Three other individuals who he claimed had been involved in those activities — “E,” 
“Phobio,”1
 At the end of the merits hearing, the IJ denied Santana’s CAT application.  As a 
preliminary matter, the IJ determined that, because Santana’s conviction constituted a 
“particularly serious crime” under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii), he was eligible only for 
deferral of removal under the CAT (as opposed to withholding of removal).  The IJ went 
on to conclude that such relief was not warranted.  Although the IJ did not question 
Santana’s credibility, the IJ found that Santana had not “submit[ted] any document to 
corroborate his claim.”  (J.A. at 25.)  The IJ further found that Santana had failed to 
demonstrate (1) that he would more likely than not be singled out and targeted in the 
Dominican Republic, and (2) that the government there would acquiesce to any efforts to 
torture him.  
 and “Cabo” — left for the Dominican Republic after learning of his 
cooperation.  When Santana was released from prison in 2003, his friend Prieto, who had 
visited the Dominican Republic two months earlier, told him that E had threatened 
Santana.  About six months before the merits hearing, Santana learned that Cabo had 
threatened him as well.  Santana testified that, if he returned to the Dominican Republic, 
the police there would be unable to protect him, and that E, Phobio, or Cabo would kill 
him.    
                                              
1 This spelling represents the phonetic spelling set forth in the hearing transcript.  
Santana’s CAT application referred to an individual named “Fulvio,” and his opening 
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 On appeal, Santana challenged only the IJ’s denial of deferral of removal (he did 
not contest the IJ’s “particularly serious crime” finding).  In June 2011, the BIA upheld 
that denial, concluding that Santana’s claim was “too speculative”: 
[Santana’s] involvement with “Phobio” and “E” occurred 
more than 10 years ago in 1999 and 2000.  [Santana] has 
never personally been threatened by them, but has just heard 
second-hand threats.  [He] speculates that if he is returned to 
the Dominican Republic he will be placed on probation for 6 
months, but he has not adequately explained how he would be 
tracked down in a country of 9 million people.  It is not even 
clear that both of [his] former co-conspirators are still alive.  
[Santana] has failed to establish that it is more likely than not 
that he will be subjected to torture at the hands of his former 
co-conspirators. 
 
(Id. at 14 (citations omitted).) 
 The BIA further concluded that, even if Santana had shown that it was more likely 
than not that his former co-conspirators would torture him, he still had failed to establish 
that the government in the Dominican Republic would acquiesce to this torture.  In 
support of this conclusion, the BIA stated that  
[a]lthough [Santana’s] testimony and the background 
materials in the record clearly reflect that police corruption is 
a problem in the Dominican Republic, the documents also 
indicate that the government is seeking to control the 
problem.  Civilian authorities generally maintained effective 
control of the security forces.  Police improvements in 
oversight, awareness, and accountability led to a perception 
that the police were making efforts to reduce incidents of 
physical abuse.  Police officers were fired or prosecuted when 
found to have acted outside of established police procedures, 
                                                                                                                                                  
brief claims that Phobio and Fulvio are one and the same.  
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and the Internal Affairs Unit effectively investigated charges 
of gross misconduct by members of the National Police. 
  
(Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).)  
 Santana timely petitioned this Court to review the BIA’s decision; that petition 
was docketed at C.A. No. 11-2838.  A few weeks after filing that petition, Santana moved 
the BIA to reopen his removal proceedings.  In support of that motion, he submitted five 
“internet articles,” arguing that this material was previously unavailable and material to 
his CAT claim.  In September 2011, the BIA denied the motion, stating that 
[Santana] has provided 5 articles addressing the Dominican 
Republic’s investigation of various drug dealers, the struggles 
of the Dominican Republic’s anti-corruption agency, and 
treatment of returning deportees.  Notwithstanding these 
articles, we find no reason to disturb our prior decision. . . . 
We find that [Santana’s] proffered articles, like the articles 
previously introduced, illustrate that while police corruption 
is a problem in the Dominican Republic, the government is 
seeking to control the problem rather than willfully ignoring 
it.  Moreover, even if the articles which mention “Fulvio” 
refer to the same man [Santana] encountered in 1999 and 
2000, we still find [Santana’s] claim speculative inasmuch as 
the articles illustrate only that Fulvio was arrested and his 
home searched but do not, in any way, address [Santana] or 
his claim.  As such, we do not find this evidence material, and 
we find no reason to remand the record for further 
proceedings regarding [Santana’s] claim under CAT. 
 
(Id. at 9 (citations, footnote, and certain internal quotation marks omitted).)  
 Santana subsequently filed another timely petition for review, this time 
challenging the BIA’s denial of reopening.  This new petition was docketed at C.A. No. 
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11-3647.  The Clerk has consolidated Santana’s two petitions, and they are now ripe for 
disposition. 
II. 
 Since Santana is removable on the basis of his having been convicted of a 
controlled substance offense, our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing constitutional claims 
and questions of law.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C)-(D); Leslie v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 
611 F.3d 171, 174 (3d Cir. 2010).  This jurisdiction “includes review of the BIA’s 
application of law to undisputed fact.”  Singh v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 533, 541 (3d Cir. 
2006).  Having outlined the scope of our review, we now examine the claims raised in 
support of Santana’s petitions. 
 Santana presents three overarching arguments in support of his challenge to the 
BIA’s decision upholding the IJ’s denial of CAT relief.  First, he argues that the agency 
erred in failing to apply the three-part test for determining whether it is reasonable to 
expect corroboration in support of an alien’s claims, see Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 
542, 554 (3d Cir. 2001) (articulating this three-part approach), and that, as a result, the 
case should be remanded so that this test may be applied.  Although the IJ did find that 
Santana had failed to corroborate his claim, we do not read the BIA’s decision as 
upholding the IJ’s denial of CAT relief based on a lack of corroboration.  Indeed, the BIA 
makes no mention of corroboration in its decision.  Instead, it concluded that the alleged 
threat of torture against Santana was simply too speculative, and that, even if he had 
established that he was likely to be tortured, the record did not show that the government 
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in the Dominican Republic would acquiesce to any such torture.  Accordingly, there is no 
need to remand this matter for application of the three-part Abdulai test. 
 Santana’s second argument is that we cannot meaningfully review the BIA’s 
decision because the BIA “failed to apply the three-part [Abdulai] test and failed to 
explain why Mr. Santana did not meet his burden of proof.”  (Pet’r’s Opening Br. 34.)  
This claim is meritless.  As indicated above, the BIA did not base its decision on a lack of 
corroboration and, as a result, did not need to conduct the three-part Abdulai test.  
Additionally, the BIA did explain, in clear terms, why he had failed to satisfy his burden 
of proof under the CAT, thereby enabling us to meaningfully review its decision.     
 Santana’s third argument is that the BIA engaged in impermissible factfinding 
when it stated, in the context of concluding that he had not shown that he would likely be 
tortured, that it was not clear whether his former co-conspirators were still alive.  We 
need not decide whether this statement amounts to impermissible factfinding because, 
independently from its conclusion on the likelihood of torture, the BIA concluded that 
Santana had not established that the government in the Dominican Republic would 
acquiesce to any efforts to torture him.  Since this latter conclusion, which is a sufficient 
basis for rejecting his CAT claim, see Gomez-Zuluaga v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 527 F.3d 
330, 349 (3d Cir. 2008), is not undergirded by the alleged improper factfinding, we need 
not disturb the BIA’s decision. 
 We now turn to the BIA’s decision denying reopening.  Santana argues that, in 
reaching this decision, the BIA “applied an erroneous legal standard by failing to 
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consider material evidence required by regulation and case law.”  (Pet’r’s Reply Br. 12.)  
We disagree.  Contrary to his claim, the BIA’s decision indicates that it indeed 
considered the five articles that he submitted in support of his motion; the BIA simply 
concluded that these articles were not material. 
 To the extent Santana takes issue with the BIA’s materiality determination, we 
conclude that such a challenge lacks merit.  For newly submitted evidence to be deemed 
“material,” it must be “of such a nature that the [BIA] is satisfied that if proceedings 
before the immigration judge were reopened . . . the new evidence offered would likely 
change the result in the case.”  Matter of Coelho, 20 I. & N. Dec. 464, 473 (BIA 1992).  
We agree with the BIA that this “heavy burden,” see id., was not satisfied in this case, for 
the five articles submitted in support of Santana’s motion to reopen would not likely 
change the agency’s determination that he had failed to establish that the government in 
the Dominican Republic would acquiesce to efforts to torture him.  Although one of the 
articles cites to an anticorruption official’s criticisms of the Dominican Republic’s justice 
system, three of the other articles document the country’s authorities’ efforts to curb the 
criminal activity of individuals who appear to be the very men Santana fears.  
Specifically, those articles collectively state that the authorities: (1) arrested a man named 
Fulvio Moya, who, according to Santana, is “Phobio”; (2) seized weapons, drugs, and 
other items from Moya’s apartment; and (3) held, for investigative purposes, the vehicle 
of an “El Cabo” — Santana claims that this is the “Cabo” he fears — who had jumped 
out of the vehicle and fled after the authorities ordered him to stop.  As for the fifth and 
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final article, which states, inter alia, that individuals deported to the Dominican Republic 
for having committed felonies are monitored by the police for six months, that article 
does not bear on the issue of whether the government in the Dominican Republic would 
acquiesce to torture.     
 In light of the above, we find no reason to disturb either of the BIA decisions at 
issue here.  Accordingly, we will deny both of Santana’s petitions for review. 
